In this work we investigate the di culty of the discrete logarithm problem in class groups of imaginary quadratic orders. In particular, we discuss several strategies to compute discrete logarithms in those class groups. Based on heuristic reasoning, we give advice for selecting the cryptographic parameter, i.e. the discriminant, such that cryptosystems based on class groups of imaginary quadratic orders would o er a similar security as commonly used cryptosystems.
Introduction
Cryptosystems based on class groups of imaginary quadratic orders (IQC) have been rst proposed by Buchmann and Williams 3, 4] in 1988 and 1990. Since then, there was no clear advice on how to select the cryptographic parameter, i.e. the discriminant of the quadratic order. The goal of this work is to close this gap. In particular, we demonstrate how large must be selected such that computing logarithms in Cl( ) is as hard as factoring an integer n of given size. We consider several strategies to compute discrete logarithms in class groups, such as reductions to other computational problems, index-calculus algorithms, Pollard's algorithm, and the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm in connection with an algorithm similar to the (p ? 1)-factoring method. In particular, in order to get the same security with IQC as with RSA with 1024 bit moduli, the discriminant should have at least 687 bits.
The security of IQC is based on the apparent di culty of computing discrete logarithms in class groups of imaginary quadratic orders (Cl-DLP). The Cl-DLP can be extended to class groups of orders of number elds with arbitrarily high degree, and in furthermore, there is a generalization of the discrete logarithm problem 2]. However, in this work we shall focus only on imaginary quadratic elds, and whenever the term class groups appears in the sequel, we actually mean class groups of imaginary quadratic orders.
It is well known that solving the Cl-DLP is at least as hard as solving the integer factorization problem (IFP, we shall describe the reduction later in this work), yet it is still unknown whether the Cl-DLP is really harder than the IFP. The Cl-DLP can be solved with a subexponential index-calculus algorithm due to Hafner and McCurley 11] . This algorithm was improved by D llmann 9]. Recently, in 28] it has been rigorously proven that for solving the Cl-DLP one can expect a running time proportional to L j j 1 2 ; 3 4 p 2 + o (1) , where is the discriminant of the imaginary quadratic order. Moreover, Jacobson 15] has applied the ideas of the MPQS to class group computations. In fact, the machinery behind his algorithm is the same as that of the original MPQS, and although his algorithm hasn't been analyzed, empirical data suggest a running time proportional to L j j 1 2 ; 1 + o (1) . The best known algorithm to solve the IFP is the GNFS with asymptotic expected running time proportional to L n h 1 3 ; 3 q 64 9 i ; the best known algorithm to solve the GF-DLP (DLP in multiplicative groups of Galois elds) is a variant of the GNFS with the same asymptotic expected running time. Thus, currently the IFP or the GF-DLP can be solved asymptotically faster than the Cl-DLP. This means that the Cl-DLP is apparently harder than the IFP or the GF-DLP.
Hence class groups form another potential alternative to nite elds for DL-based cryptographic protocols. Unfortunately, popular signature protocols such as DSA can't be used with class groups in a direct way, because DSA requires the knowledge of the group order. Computing the order of an arbitrary class group appears to be as hard as computing discrete logarithms in class groups, because there's no e cient algorithm known that computes the class number. In 21] a variant of the Schnorr signature scheme that doesn't require knowledge of the group order has been proposed.
Computing roots without knowing the class number also appears to be intractable. This makes the Guillou-Quisquater signature protocol 10] suitable for class groups, since in this protocol even the signer does not need to know the class number. Moreover, in 1] a variant of DSA was presented that is based on the intractability to compute roots in nite abelian groups.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall the background we need, and in Section 3 we give advice for selecting the security parameters.
Class groups
Recall that we consider class groups of imaginary quadratic elds only. We shall state only some necessary facts without proofs; for details we refer to 8, 5] In this section we shall see that the discriminant is the cryptographic parameter. We shall discuss how to select a discriminant such that, based on heuristic grounds, computing discrete logarithms or the order of arbitrary elements in the corresponding class group is intractable. In particular, must be chosen so that there is no e cient reduction of the CL-DLP to simpler problems, j j must be large enough to preclude attacks with index-calculus algorithms, h( ) must be large enough to preclude attacks with algorithms, It is tempting to ask whether the discriminant can be chosen such that its class number has properties selected priori. However, we have no control over the class number, i.e. there's not even a probabilistic e cient algorithm known which outputs a fundamental discriminant whose class number has certain interesting properties (e.g. contains a large prime factor).
We shall show in the following subsections that if is chosen appropriately, then the above conditions hold with high probability. In particular, in Sect. 3.1 we show that selecting = ?p or = ?8pq where p; q are primes precludes reductions to the GF-DLP and keeps the two-part of Cl( ) small. In Sect. 3.2 we show how large must be to preclude indexcalculus attacks. In Sect. 3.3 we show how large the class group must be to preclude attacks with the aid of Pollard's -method; based on the Brauer-Siegel theorem we deduce the size of the discriminant. In Sect. 3.4 we describe the relevance of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for class groups and discuss a possible application in conjunction with another algorithm, which is similar to the (p ? 1)-factoring method. Let a smoothness bound B be given; in Sect. 3.5, based on heuristic assumptions we show how must be chosen so that the class number is B-smooth only with negligible probability.
It turns out that asymptotically the index-calculus methods dominate the selection of the discriminant with respect to order of magnitude. Moreover, since the best known algorithm to compute class numbers of fundamental discriminants are again index-calculus methods, it is infeasible to compute the class number of fundamental discriminants if these are large. Therefore, the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm plays no role for class groups of maximal orders, unless the class number is smooth, because then an algorithm similar to the (p ? 1)-factoring algorithm can be applied to compute the class number. (?8=p). Since in general it is intractable to compute class numbers of large fundamental discriminants (see below), this could be a nice way to avoid it altogether. However, the Cl-DLP in Cl(?8p 2 ) can be reduced in polynomial time to the GF-DLP in F p 13]. Currently no e cient reductions of this type for maximal orders are known, therefore we shall use only class groups of maximal orders, and in the sequel will always be fundamental and thus O will be maximal.
Selection of a fundamental discriminant
In order to check whether an arbitrary discriminant is fundamental, it must be checked whether ( Observe that = ?8pq is attractive by a complexity theoretic argument, because if is composite, then Cl( ) has non-trivial ambiguous elements, whose components lead immediately to a factorization of ; these ambiguous elements can be obtained by computing discrete logarithms in Cl( ), therefore IFP Cl-DLP. p 2 has been shown in 28]. However, Jacobson 15] showed that one can use a variant of the MPQS for DL-computations in Cl( ). The MPQS factoring algorithm has a conjectured expected running time proportional to L n 1 2 ; 1 , while the MPQS DL-computation algorithm hasn't been analyzed, yet (not even heuristically). Empirical data suggests an expected running time of L j j 1 2 ; 1 , so we shall base our arguments on this running time. In terms of security and e ciency, this will yield slightly larger keys: If we underestimate the running time of the Cl-MPQS, we overestimate the size of the security relevant parameters. This conservative approach is quite common practice.
Class group computations by index-calculus techniques
The usual approach to estimate running times of an algorithm for large input parameters is to start from the empirical running time for smaller input parameters. Table 1 : Estimated expected computational work of the GNFS for larger inputs Table 1 shows some extrapolated running times for the GNFS. They are based on data points of the factorization of RSA-155 (155 decimal digits, 512 bits) with the GNFS 26]. In particular, it was estimated that about 8000 MIPS-years were spent.
To estimate the expected running time of the MPQS for DL-computations in class groups for large groups, we made extensive experiments where we computed discrete logarithms in 20 class groups of di erent negative discriminants for each magnitude tabulated below. The computations were carried out on a Sparc with ULTRA-170 processor. The results are summarized in Table 2 Table 2 : Empirical computational work of the Cl-MPQS for relatively small inputs Table 2 supports the conjectured running time of L j j 1 2 ; 1 for the MPQS. Note also that the standard deviation is almost always about half the running time. This shows that the running times are pretty spread, which in turn con rms our suspicions of taking just a single sample.
All computations were performed on a SUN-workstation with a Sparc ULTRA-170 processor. SUN Microsystems does not publish MIPS ratings for its machines, and in fact, the unit MIPS-year is actually not appropriate 25]. However, it is widely used, so for simplicity we assume 100 MIPS, which is a value of reasonable order of magnitude for this machine. By Table 2 let us assume that L j j 1 2 ; 1 =t = 1:8 10 7 sec ?1 . Then we get the extrapolations in Table 3 .
When we align the parameters of the IFP and of the Cl-DLP in such a way that the expected running time for solving the Cl-DLP roughly equals the expected running time for solving the IFP for n of some particular magnitudes, we get By the heuristics of Cohen and Lenstra 7, 6] , the probability that Cl odd ( ) is cyclic is equal to 0:9775 : : : . Moreover, it can be deduced from the heuristics that if Cl odd ( ) is not cyclic, then with high probability Cl odd ( ) has a cyclic subgroup G cyc such that jG cyc j has the same order of magnitude as h odd ( ), and therefore, by our selection of , the even part is 1 or 8 and thus jG cyc j and h( ) have the same order of magnitude.
In order to provide a lower bound for we need an (asymptotic) lower bound for h( ) that depends on only. The best proven explicit lower bound is h( ) > 1=55 ln j j . This result has been proven for averages taken over class numbers of fundamental discriminants. In this work we make the assumption that this result is not a ected by the restriction to the special discriminants given in section 3.1.1.
Example The time to perform a single group operation in Cl( ) depends on , yet let us assume a xed time of 1 ms on a machine with a computing power of 100 MIPS. Then the computational work of a single MIPS-year is equivalent to 2 29 group operations. Based on this assumption and on the assumed average for the class number of a prime discriminant, in Table 5 we present some samples for (prime) discriminants, their average class number, and the expected computing amount to compute discrete logarithms by the -method; compare this with Table 1 
Class group computations and the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm utilizes the prime factorization of the group order in order to simplify DL computations. However, the best known algorithm for computing the class number is a variant of MPQS for DL computations in class groups and has the same expected asymptotic running time. Thus, if j j is large, it is infeasible to compute h( ) or even odd multiples or factors (in particular the smooth part) of h( ). Moreover, there is no e cient method known that checks whether a particular odd prime divides h( ). Consequently, the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is not applicable to class groups in general. There are also cryptographic protocols (e.g. the Guillou-Quisquater signature protocol) that depend explicitly on the fact that the group order is unknown. We now consider the special case when h( ) is smooth. If the class number is smooth, there is a practical method to compute the order of an arbitrary element by a method similar to the (p ? 1)-factoring method. That is, given 2 Cl( ), set 0 and repeat the complete procedure with 0 , then we obtain the second largest prime factor, and eventually we get the complete prime factorization of ord Cl( ) . Then we are able to compute roots as well as discrete logarithms in h i with the aid of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm.
Assume that the (p?1)-like method above succeeds for an element and a bound B, and let q denote the largest prime factor of ord Cl( ) . It is obvious that if we use a fast exponentiation method, then we have to perform at least P p<q e(p; B) log 2 p group operations to nd q. In order to nd a smoothness-bound, we must consider the easiest case, i.e. e(p i ; B) = 1 for all p i . Now P p<q log 2 p = (q)= ln 2, where is the Chebyshev -function. In 23, 24] it was shown that 0:998697 x < (x) < 1:001093 x for all x 1155901 (under assumption of the Riemann hypothesis, it is even possible to show that j (x) ? xj = 1=(8 ) p x ln 2 x for x 599, cf. 23, 24] ). Therefore, to nd q we have to perform about q= ln 2 group operations. Note that we get the same result even in the case e(p i ; q) = log p i q, because P p<q log 2 p i log p i q = (q) log 2 q = q= ln 2 as q ! 1. Example We continue the example from the previous section. By Table 5 , 2 64 group operations take about 6:6 10 10 MIPS-years (similar to the computational work to factor a 1024 bit integer with the aid of the GNFS). If we assume that this amount of work is infeasible, then it is safe to select a 63 bit smoothness-bound. At the end of the next section we shall see that a smaller smoothness-bound is su cient.
The smoothness probability of class numbers
The estimates in this section are based on the heuristics of Cohen and Lenstra 7, 6] , although our derivation is not rigorous at all. A more rigorous derivation should be done as in 6]; this is work in progress, and we shall present the results in a future work. In this work we compare class numbers and ordinary integers with respect to smoothness, and we argue that under reasonable assumptions the probability to get a smooth class number of a random fundamental discriminant is not much larger than the probability that a random integer is smooth.
Consider the set of all negative fundamental discriminants such that j j N for some bound N. Based on the heuristics of Cohen and Lenstra we assume that, given an odd prime p much smaller than N and a positive integer i, the proportion of such discriminants satisfying where the latter approximation can be seen as follows: (1 + 1=p) = (1 ? 1=p 2 )=(1 ? 1=p) Now if we choose j j so large that random integers of the expected order of h( ) are smooth only with probability close to 0, then the modest maximum size of F k indicates that the tendency of the class number towards having small factors does not mean it will be smooth with non-negligible probability.
Speci cally, let B = M 1=u ; then the probability that a random positive integer less than M is B-smooth is approximately (u), where is Dickmann's -function 14]. We arrive at an estimated probability of at most (u) Assume that an attacker applies the algorithm from the preceding section to class groups of random discriminants of a certain length (chosen as described in Sect. 3.1.1). Further assume that he will spend at most W max computational work for a single class group until he gives up, and that B is the smoothness-bound for which he can succeed with this amount of work. Then he can expect one case of success for an investment of computational work W = W max = Pr ? h( ) is B-smooth . We will determine lower bounds for the size of based on this attack scenario.
Recall that 1 MIPS-year is approximately equivalent to 2 29 group operations. Let W = 2 64 group operations which, by Tables 1 and 5 , is comparable to the expected computational work to factor a composite 1024 bit integer by the GNFS; then W is currently infeasible (see also 17] for extrapolations into the future). Let W max = 2 42 group operations (corresponding to a smoothness bound of approximately 2 42 = ln 2, cf. section 3.4), which is comparable to the expected work to factor a 512 bit integer by the GNFS. Then a smoothness-probability of up to 2 ?22 is acceptable, thus we need u such that (u) 8 2 ?22 , and this is satis ed by u = 8. Since B 2 41:5 , the discriminant should have at least 666 bits for case 1 of section 3.1.1, and at least 672 bits for case 2 of section 3.1.1.
If W max is larger or if a smaller smoothness-probability is demanded, then the order of magnitude of the discriminant will increase accordingly. For instance, if we choose Pr ? h( ) is B-smooth = 2 ?30 with W max (and hence B) as before, then u = 9:6, and thus the discriminant should have at least 799 (case 1) or 805 (case 2) bits. tems based on class groups o er a comparable security as commonly used cryptosystems (such as RSA). In particular, we have shown that the size of the discriminant asymptotically depends only on index-calculus algorithms (see Table 4 ). Thus, since index-calculus algorithms for solving the Cl-DLP are asymptotically much slower than index-calculus algorithms to solve the IFP (such as the GNFS), the discriminant can be selected smaller than a RSA modulus.
In a future work we shall demonstrate the impact of this result on the e ciency and performance of IQC. As a further research project we would also like to replace the heuristic reasoning of Sect. 3.5 by a more rigorous reasoning.
